Notional 1FT Voting Architecture with Time-Triggered Ethernet by Loveless, Andrew
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration
Andrew Loveless (NASA JSC/EV2)
Approved for Public Release –
No Export Controlled Data
Slide: 1/56
Notional 1FT Voting Architecture
with Time-Triggered Ethernet
AES A&S Tag-Up Meeting
7 November 2016
Andrew Loveless (NASA JSC)
andrew.loveless@nasa.gov
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170001652 2019-08-31T17:25:04+00:00Z
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration
Andrew Loveless (NASA JSC/EV2)
Approved for Public Release –
No Export Controlled Data
Slide: 2/56
1-Byzantine resilient C&DH system (fail-operational).
• Uses triplex onboard computers (OBCs) executing identical flight software.
• >1FT relies on sparing and crew intervention (e.g. independent backup).
Assumes classical reliability requirement of 10-9 failures/hour.
Realizable with currently available COTS technology.*
• E.g. Can be implemented using a variety of SBCs and real-time OSs.
Scalable fault tolerance (both in classification and quantity).
• E.g. Through additional network planes, high-integrity devices, etc.
Assumes full cross strapping between OBCs, network switches, and
end devices/subsystems (e.g. RIUs, IMUs, MBSUs).
• Minimizes number of 2-fault combinations which can cause system failure.
• Prioritizes high data availability and architectural flexibility over low SWaP.
Redundant Time-Triggered Ethernet network used for data exchange
and synchronization between computing platforms.
• Eliminates need for independent Cross-Channel Data Link (CCDL).
General Overview
* This presentation proposes the use of TTTech’s rad-hard space ASIC (available Q3 2017).
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Consensus Approach
Fault Type Description System
Fail-Stop
The node does not produce any output.
• E.g. Process halts before “send to all”.
Failover/Standby
Crash
The node does not produce any output.
• Can remain undetected by good nodes.
N-Modular 
Redundancy
(synchronized majority
voting system)
Omission Follows algorithm, but messages are lost.
Value Node produces incorrect computation result.
Timing
Outputs are delivered too early or too late.
• I.e. Node does not meet temporal specifications.
Symmetric
Peers see the fault manifest in the same way.
• E.g. Node send arbitrary data to all or nobody.
Byzantine
Peers see the fault manifest in different ways.
• E.g. Node sends different data to different peers.
Byzantine 
Agreement
Different Fault Classifications (there is overlap)
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Ensuring Input Data Consistency
Where does byzantine tolerance matter? Agreeing on input data
• Problem: single source (internal or external) distribution to multiple receivers.
• In our case, the input seen by each redundant processor must be bitwise 
identical – i.e. have interactive consistency.
• Why? If all processors get the same input, then all non-faulty processors are 
guaranteed to produce identical output.
 Can be used to ID faulty processors and resolve commands sent by the OBCs.
Consensus versus Correctness
• A faulty input device may provide arbitrary input data to the OBCs.
• The purpose is to guarantee all OBCs have the same view of the system, and 
can therefore decide on the same input value.
 I.e. the IC exchange guarantees consensus, but not that the input is “correct”.
• If an accurate input value is important, you need redundant input devices.
Avoiding hardware shortcuts
• It is tempting to try circumventing the problem through increased connectivity.
 E.g. Trying to ensure all OBCs read some input data from the same shared wire.
• However, a faulty device may transmit a marginal signal that may be interpreted 
as different values by different OBCs.
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Rules for Interactive Consistency
What is an interstage?
• An interstage is an FCR that participates in the interactive consistency 
exchange, but does not require consensus.
• The purpose of an interstage is to provide the necessary functionality to 
perform byzantine agreement algorithms without requiring all FCRs to 
be full processors.
Rules for interactive consistency in 1FT voting systems:
• Requires ≥ 3(1) + 1 = 4 Fault Containment Regions (FCRs).
• Each interstage must receive data through ≥1 disjoint paths.
• Devices requiring consensus get data from ≥ 2(1) + 1 = 3 disjoint paths.
• Above must be satisfied in (1) + 1 = 2 rounds of data exchange.
• After data exchange, devices requiring consensus perform an absolute 
majority vote of received messages.
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Classical Approach – Channelized Bus
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Classical Approach – Channelized Bus
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General Overview
• A 1FT design can be
realized with either:
1. 4 full processors/OBCs
2. 3 OBCs + 1 interstage
• End devices are networked directly
to one of the OBCs via a bus.
• Fully channelized design –
Each OBC has access only
to devices on its own local bus. 
• Requires independent CCDL for data exchange
and synchronization (or an external reference).
Meeting Requirements
• ≥ 3(1) + 1 FCRs? Yes - each OBC/interstage
+ its CCDL links (4 FCRs total).
• ≥ 2(1) + 1 disjoint paths b/w FCRs? Yes
• (1) + 1 rounds of data exchange? Yes –
performed in succession over the CCDL.
• (4 - 1) + 4(4 - 1) = 15 msgs per exchange.
Examples
• NASA X-38, LM X-33, NASA Ares I, ULA Delta IV.
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General Overview
• A 1FT design can be
realized with either:
1. 4 full processors/OBCs
2. 3 OBCs + 1 interstage
• End devices are networked directly
to one of the OBCs via a bus.
• Fully channelized design –
Each OBC has access only
to devices on its own local bus. 
• Requires independent CCDL for data exchange
and synchronization (or an external reference).
Meeting Requirements
• ≥ 3(1) + 1 FCRs? Yes - each OBC/interstage
+ its CCDL links (4 FCRs total).
• ≥ 2(1) + 1 disjoint paths b/w FCRs? Yes
• (1) + 1 rounds of data exchange? Yes –
performed in succession over the CCDL.
• (4 - 1) + 4(4 - 1) = 15 msgs per exchange.
Examples
• NASA X-38, LM X-33, NASA Ares I, ULA Delta IV.
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General Overview
• A 1FT design can be
realized with either:
1. 4 full processors/OBCs
2. 3 OBCs + 1 interstage
• End devices are networked directly
to one of the OBCs via a bus.
• Fully channelized design –
Each OBC has access only
to devices on its own local bus. 
• Requires independent CCDL for data exchange
and synchronization (or an external reference).
Detect lying using authentication
• Many launcher applications relax the
requirement for 4 FCRs by using the idea
of “unforgeable” signed messages.
 Insufficient reliability for long mission durations.
Relaxed Requirements
• ≥ 2(1) + 1 = 3 FCRs - each OBC + links.
• ≥ (1) + 1 = 2 disjoint paths between FCRs.
• (3 - 1) + 3(3 - 1) = 8 messages per exchange.
Classical Approach – Channelized Bus
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Certain BFT SM requirements are not fully realizable:
I. A non-faulty OBC’s signature cannot be forged.
• Requires ≥60-bit signatures – computationally expensive. 
II. Any alteration of a message can be detected.
• Schrodinger’s CRC – a single stuck-at-1/2 bit can result in 
different messages that look “correct” to multiple receivers.
Cryptography in flight control systems 
represents a different set of priorities.
• Low SWaP > Long term reliability.
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Step 1: Read data
• OBCs 1-3 reads data
from local input device.
 No guarantee data agrees.
Step 2: Exchange
• OBCs 1-3 send their initial 
values to OBCs 1-3 + interstage.
 An OBC may “lie” arbitrarily to its
peers (results in an asymmetric view).
Step 3: Exchange (Rd 2)
• OBCs 1-3 + interstage send round 1 data
to all OBCs 1-3 (round 2).
 Still, any FCR 1-4 could fail asymmetrically.
Step 4: Create symmetry
• OBCs 1-3 performs majority voting of round
2 data to “correct” round 1 data (non-faulty
OBCs now share the same IC vector).
Step 5: Make a decision
• OBCs 1-3 execute a choice() function to
select a final value (e.g. median, mean).
Channelized Bus – Reading Data (1)
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Step 1: Read data
• OBCs 1-3 reads data
from local input device.
 No guarantee data agrees.
Step 2: Exchange
• OBCs 1-3 send their initial 
values to OBCs 1-3 + interstage.
 An OBC may “lie” arbitrarily to its
peers (results in an asymmetric view).
Step 3: Exchange (Rd 2)
• OBCs 1-3 + interstage send round 1 data
to all OBCs 1-3 (round 2).
 Still, any FCR 1-4 could fail asymmetrically.
Step 4: Create symmetry
• OBCs 1-3 performs majority voting of round
2 data to “correct” round 1 data (non-faulty
OBCs now share the same IC vector).
Step 5: Make a decision
• OBCs 1-3 execute a choice() function to
select a final value (e.g. median, mean).
Channelized Bus – Reading Data (2)
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Step 1: Read data
• OBCs 1-3 reads data
from local input device.
 No guarantee data agrees.
Step 2: Exchange
• OBCs 1-3 send their initial 
values to OBCs 1-3 + interstage.
 An OBC may “lie” arbitrarily to its
peers (results in an asymmetric view).
Step 3: Exchange (Rd 2)
• OBCs 1-3 + interstage send round 1 data
to all OBCs 1-3 (round 2).
 Still, any FCR 1-4 could fail asymmetrically.
Step 4: Create symmetry
• OBCs 1-3 performs majority voting of round
2 data to “correct” round 1 data (non-faulty
OBCs now share the same IC vector).
Step 5: Make a decision
• OBCs 1-3 execute a choice() function to
select a final value (e.g. median, mean).
Channelized Bus – Reading Data (3)
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Step 1: Read data
• OBCs 1-3 reads data
from local input device.
 No guarantee data agrees.
Step 2: Exchange
• OBCs 1-3 send their initial 
values to OBCs 1-3 + interstage.
 An OBC may “lie” arbitrarily to its
peers (results in an asymmetric view).
Step 3: Exchange (Rd 2)
• OBCs 1-3 + interstage send round 1 data
to all OBCs 1-3 (round 2).
 Still, any FCR 1-4 could fail asymmetrically.
Step 4: Create symmetry
• OBCs 1-3 performs majority voting of round
2 data to “correct” round 1 data (non-faulty
OBCs now share the same IC vector).
Step 5: Make a decision
• OBCs 1-3 execute a choice() function to
select a final value (e.g. median, mean).
Channelized Bus – Reading Data (4)
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Both non-faulty OBCs 
now share the same 
view of the system. 
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Step 1: Read data
• OBCs 1-3 reads data
from local input device.
 No guarantee data agrees.
Step 2: Exchange
• OBCs 1-3 send their initial 
values to OBCs 1-3 + interstage.
 An OBC may “lie” arbitrarily to its
peers (results in an asymmetric view).
Step 3: Exchange (Rd 2)
• OBCs 1-3 + interstage send round 1 data
to all OBCs 1-3 (round 2).
 Still, any FCR 1-4 could fail asymmetrically.
Step 4: Create symmetry
• OBCs 1-3 performs majority voting of round
2 data to “correct” round 1 data (non-faulty
OBCs now share the same IC vector).
Step 5: Make a decision
• OBCs 1-3 execute a choice() function to
select a final value (e.g. median, mean).
Channelized Bus – Reading Data (5)
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All non-faulty OBCs will 
select the same input data. 
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Channelized Bus – Commanding (1)
Step 1: Prepare Command
• After computation,
OBCs 1-3 each
generate a command.
 All non-faulty OBCs agree.
Step 2: Exchange
• OBCs 1-3 send their output
values to OBCs 1-3.
 Again, an OBC may “lie” arbitrarily to
its peers (results in an asymmetric view).
 This behavior is tolerated, since the non-faulty
OBCs do not need to have consensus on
the entire view of the system.
Step 3: Majority Vote
• Each OBCs 1-3 performs a majority vote
to correct its initial output value.
 .Process can be used to detect faulty OBCs and
initiate fault recovery or system reconfiguration.
Step 4: Transmit Command
• OBCs 1-3 send the command to the
output device connected to their local bus.
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Cross-Channel Data Link (CCDL)
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Channelized Bus – Commanding (2)
Step 1: Prepare Command
• After computation,
OBCs 1-3 each
generate a command.
 All non-faulty OBCs agree.
Step 2: Exchange
• OBCs 1-3 send their output
values to OBCs 1-3.
 Again, an OBC may “lie” arbitrarily to
its peers (results in an asymmetric view).
 This behavior is tolerated, since the non-faulty
OBCs do not need to have consensus on
the entire view of the system.
Step 3: Majority Vote
• Each OBCs 1-3 performs a majority vote
to correct its initial output value.
 .Process can be used to detect faulty OBCs and
initiate fault recovery or system reconfiguration.
Step 4: Transmit Command
• OBCs 1-3 send the command to the
output device connected to their local bus.
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Channelized Bus – Commanding (3)
Step 1: Prepare Command
• After computation,
OBCs 1-3 each
generate a command.
 All non-faulty OBCs agree.
Step 2: Exchange
• OBCs 1-3 send their output
values to OBCs 1-3.
 Again, an OBC may “lie” arbitrarily to
its peers (results in an asymmetric view).
 This behavior is tolerated, since the non-faulty
OBCs do not need to have consensus on
the entire view of the system.
Step 3: Majority Vote
• Each OBCs 1-3 performs a majority vote
to correct its initial output value.
 .Process can be used to detect faulty OBCs and
initiate fault recovery or system reconfiguration.
Step 4: Transmit Command
• OBCs 1-3 send the command to the
output device connected to their local bus.
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Non-faulty OBCs can 
identify other faulty 
FCRs – but view may 
not be consistent!. 
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Channelized Bus – Commanding (4)
Step 1: Prepare Command
• After computation,
OBCs 1-3 each
generate a command.
 All non-faulty OBCs agree.
Step 2: Exchange
• OBCs 1-3 send their output
values to OBCs 1-3.
 Again, an OBC may “lie” arbitrarily to
its peers (results in an asymmetric view).
 This behavior is tolerated, since the non-faulty
OBCs do not need to have consensus on
the entire view of the system.
Step 3: Majority Vote
• Each OBCs 1-3 performs a majority vote
to correct its initial output value.
 .Process can be used to detect faulty OBCs and
initiate fault recovery or system reconfiguration.
Step 4: Transmit Command
• OBCs 1-3 send the command to the
output device connected to their local bus.
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Channelized Bus – Detailed Exchange
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The value received 
from OBC2 is 
different for each 
non-faulty FCR. 
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Channelized Bus – Detailed Exchange
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Information Exchange – Round 2 1 2 3
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OBC2 tries to force 
consensus by 
agreeing with OBC1.
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Create Symmetry - Majority Voting
On OBCs 1-3, each element in the interactive
consistency (IC) vector is set to the strict majority 
of its children.
 I.e. OBCs 1,3 must agree on data from OBC 2.
Channelized Bus – Detailed Exchange
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OBC3
IC Vector:
Making a Decision
On OBCs 1-3, a choice() function is
used to determine a final value from 
those contained in the IC vector.
 E.g. a mid-value selection.
58
58
All non-faulty OBCs 
now agree on the 
data originally sent 
by OBCs 1-3. 
In a channelized system, 
remediating OBCs 1-3 is 
the same as remediating 
IMUs 1-3 (the devices). 
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IC Exchange – Alternate Viewpoint (1)
“Flattening” the classical two-round exchange
• Can be analyzed as messaging over redundant paths (from different FCRs).
• Makes it easier to see why 4 FCRs and 3 disjoint paths are necessary.
56
1 2 3
1
2
3
4
OBC1
IC Vector:
56
1 2 3
1
2
3
4
OBC3
IC Vector:
1:56
1:56 1:56
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration
Andrew Loveless (NASA JSC/EV2)
Approved for Public Release –
No Export Controlled Data
Slide: 23/56
IC Exchange – Alternate Viewpoint (2)
“Flattening” the classical two-round exchange
• Can be analyzed as messaging over redundant paths (from different FCRs).
• Makes it easier to see why 4 FCRs and 3 disjoint paths are necessary.
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Path 2
Path 3
Path 1
Path 3
For simplicity, not all Round 2 messages are shown.
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Generalizing use of interstages (1)
Rules for IC in 1FT voting systems:
• Requires ≥ 3(1) + 1 = 4 FCRs.
• Interstages need data from ≥1 paths.
• Devices requiring consensus need data 
from ≥ 2(1) + 1 = 3 disjoint paths.
• Two rounds of data exchange.
• Devices requiring consensus perform
majority vote over received messages.
Device requiring consensus
Interstage (does not require consensus)
Designates originating device
Designates faulty device
Assumption: Any device may fail arbitrarily
(omission, symmetric, asymmetric, byzantine). 
Example 1: 
• Four total FCRs
• Two interstages
• Two devices require consensus
1 2
1 2
Round 1
Round 2
1 path
1 path
1 path
5
5
5
3 paths
2 paths
5
5
5
X Y
5, X, 5
Final: 5
5, Y, 5
Final: 5
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Generalizing use of interstages (2)
Rules for IC in 1FT voting systems:
• Requires ≥ 3(1) + 1 = 4 FCRs.
• Interstages need data from ≥1 paths.
• Devices requiring consensus need data 
from ≥ 2(1) + 1 = 3 disjoint paths.
• Two rounds of data exchange.
• Devices requiring consensus perform
majority vote over received messages.
Device requiring consensus
Interstage (does not require consensus)
Designates originating device
Designates faulty device
Assumption: Any device may fail arbitrarily
(omission, symmetric, asymmetric, byzantine). 
Example 2: 
• Five total FCRs
• Three interstages
• Two devices require consensus
Round 1
Round 2
1 2
1 path
5
21
5
1 path 1 path
5
5
5
5 5
3 paths 3 paths
X
5, 5, X
Final: 5
5, 5
Final: 5
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Switched Triplex (Fully Cross-strapped)
COM1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
M
OBC2
MCMC C
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
MC
COM2
MC
RIU1
MC
COM2
MC
RIU2
IMU1
MC
IMU2
MC
IMU3
MC
PDU1
MC
PDU2
MC
PDU3
MC
Input
Devices
Output
Devices
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High-Integrity Devices in TTEthernet
COM MON
listen_in
listen_out
intercept
IN OUT
High-Integrity Design
• Command/Monitor (COM/MON) design aims
for error containment within the device.
• Contains two fault containment regions.
• Input is forwarded to both COM and MON.
• Congruency exchange ensures both COM and
MON have identical input data (i.e. IC).
• Both COM and MON process data in parallel.
• Output from COM is forwarded to MON.
• If disagreement, MON terminates the transmission.
Device Failure Assumptions
• Standard devices may be subject to byzantine failures.
• Device may send arbitrary messages (of any contents).
• Device may transmit messages at arbitrary points in time.
• Device may send different messages through different network planes (channels).
• High-Integrity devices may be subject to inconsistent omission failures.
• Faulty device will not create (nor modify existing to produce) a new valid message.
• Device may drop or fail to receive an arbitrary number of messages.
• Device may fail to relay messages asymmetrically – some receivers may not get data.
Note that a transmitted 
message may be 
truncated – the receiver 
rejects the message.
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Rules for Interactive Consistency
What is an interstage?
• An interstage is an FCR that participates in the interactive consistency 
exchange, but does not require consensus.
• The purpose of an interstage is to provide the necessary functionality to 
perform byzantine agreement algorithms without requiring all FCRs to 
be full processors.
Rules for interactive consistency in 1FT voting systems:
• Requires ≥ 3(1) + 1 = 4 Fault Containment Regions (FCRs).
• Each interstage must receive data through ≥1 disjoint paths.
• Devices which require consensus must get data from:
I. ≥ 2(1) + 1 = 3 standard-integrity devices, or
II. ≥ (1) + 1 = 2 high-integrity devices, or
III. A combination of the above
• Above must be satisfied in (1) + 1 = 2 rounds of data exchange.
• After data exchange, devices requiring consensus perform an absolute 
majority vote of received messages.
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Generalizing use of (HI) interstages
Rules for IC in 1FT voting systems:
• Requires ≥ 3(1) + 1 = 4 FCRs.
• Interstages need data from ≥1 paths.
• Devices requiring consensus need data:
I. from ≥ 2(1) + 1 = 3 LI devices
II. from from ≥ (1) + 1 = 2 HI devices
III. from a combination of the above
• Two rounds of data exchange.
• Majority vote used to reach consensus.
Device requiring consensus
LI Interstage (does not require consensus)
HI interstage (does not require consensus)
Designates originating device
Designates faulty device
Assumption: LI devices may fail arbitrarily, HI 
devices may fail via inconsistent omission. 
Example 3: 
• Six total FCRs
• Two HI interstages
• Two devices require consensus
1 2
1 2
Round 1
Round 2
1 path
1 path
5
5
2 paths
2 paths
5
5
5
5, 5
Final: 5
5
Final: 5
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Generalizing use of (HI) interstages
Rules for IC in 1FT voting systems:
• Requires ≥ 3(1) + 1 = 4 FCRs.
• Interstages need data from ≥1 paths.
• Devices requiring consensus need data:
I. from ≥ 2(1) + 1 = 3 LI devices
II. from from ≥ (1) + 1 = 2 HI devices
III. from a combination of the above
• Two rounds of data exchange.
• Majority vote used to reach consensus.
Device requiring consensus
LI Interstage (does not require consensus)
HI interstage (does not require consensus)
Designates originating device
Designates faulty device
Assumption: LI devices may fail arbitrarily, HI 
devices may fail via inconsistent omission. 
Example 4: 
• Six total FCRs
• One HI + two LI interstages
• Two devices require consensus
Round 1
Round 2
1 2
1 path
5
21
5
1 path 1 path
5
5
5
Z
3 paths 3 paths
5, 5
Final: 5
5, Z, 5
Final: 5
5
5
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Switched Triplex (Fully Cross-strapped)
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
M
OBC2
MCMC C
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
OUT1
MC
OUT2
MC
OUT3
MC
General Overview
• Scalable 1FT design can be realized with:
• 3 full processors/OBCs
• 2-3 redundant network planes (interstages).
• Majority voting of redundant messages.
• Fully-cross strapped design – each OBC
has access to any networked device.
• Time-Triggered Ethernet network provides
data distribution and synchronization
between platforms.
• Does not require separate CCDL or
timing/synchronization hardware.
• Triplex OBCs do not directly interface to
any end devices (insulated by network).
Device Characteristics
• COM/MON switches, standard integrity ESs.
• Error Containment Unit b/w switch ingress/egress.
• Switches provide 1FT or 2FT availability
depending on number of channels.
• COM/MON switches required as trusted
Compression Masters (CM) for sync.
• HI switches cannot protect against valid
frames containing erroneous data.
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General Overview
• Scalable 1FT design can be realized with:
• 3 full processors/OBCs
• 2-3 redundant network planes (interstages).
• Majority voting of redundant messages.
• Fully-cross strapped design – each OBC
has access to any networked device.
• Time-Triggered Ethernet network provides
data distribution and synchronization
between platforms.
• Does not require separate CCDL or
timing/synchronization hardware.
• Triplex OBCs do not directly interface to
any end devices (insulated by network).
Device Characteristics
• COM/MON switches, standard integrity ESs.
• Error Containment Unit b/w switch ingress/egress.
• Switches provide 1FT or 2FT availability
depending on number of channels.
• COM/MON switches required as trusted
Compression Masters (CM) for sync.
• HI switches cannot protect against valid
frames containing erroneous data
Switched Triplex (Fully Cross-strapped)
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
M
OBC2
MCMC C
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
OUT1
MC
OUT2
MC
OUT3
MC
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
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Required redundant channels
• A 1FT configuration requiring only two
network planes is possible only if switches
are fully self-checking (fail-silent).
• A restricted failure mode model requires the
realization of two independent FCRs.
• Inconsistent omission is a reduced model.
• Must eliminate common mode elements:
• E.g. Shared timer, dielectric isolation,
physical space, temperature.
• If the switch may fail arbitrarily, then three
redundant channels are always required.
• In all cases, 3x channels minimizes number
of two-fault combinations resulting in system
failure over 2x channels.
Current Implementation
• TTTech COM/MON devices share power
(with separate power monitor).
• A shared oscillator is used for COM/MON,
with a dedicated clock monitor to prevent
common mode clock failures.
Switched Triplex (Dual-Channel)
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
M
OBC2
MCMC C
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
OUT1
MC
OUT2
MC
OUT3
MC
SW1
MC
SW3
MC
Even with extensive self-checking, some fault 
modes could “escape”.  We must either:
1. Prove complete coverage,  or
2. Design the system to tolerate the escape 
of an arbitrary fault (i.e. 3 channels).
Fault-propagation from switches theoretically 
requires dual-correlated simultaneous faults.
 1e-6 X 1e-6 = ~1e-12 failures/hour
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Switched Triplex – Reading Data (1)
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
M
OBC2
MCMC C
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
OUT1
MC
OUT2
MC
OUT3
MC
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
Step 1: Exchange (Round 1)
• Each redundant input device (any #)
transmits its data to switches 1-3.
 No guarantee non-faulty devices agree.
 A failed device may transmit arbitrarily.
Step 2: Exchange (Round 2)
• Switches 1-3 send each redundant
input message to all OBCs 1-3.
Step 3: Create symmetry
• OBCs 1-3 performs a majority vote of
the message copies received from each
redundant network channel.
 Messages that violate the protocol are dropped.
 Majority must be determined according to number
of messages received (i.e. not static 2/3).
 Non-faulty OBCs now share the same IC vector.
Step 4: Make a decision
• OBCs 1-3 execute a choice()
function to select a final value from
the redundant input devices
(e.g. median, mean).
9 X
7
7 7
5
5
5
Switches must act as
guardians to prevent input
device babbling (temporal).
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Step 1: Exchange (Round 1)
• Each redundant input device (any #)
transmits its data to switches 1-3.
 No guarantee non-faulty devices agree.
 A failed device may transmit arbitrarily.
Step 2: Exchange (Round 2)
• Switches 1-3 send each redundant
input message to all OBCs 1-3.
Step 3: Create symmetry
• OBCs 1-3 performs a majority vote of
the message copies received from each
redundant network channel.
 Messages that violate the protocol are dropped.
 Majority must be determined according to number
of messages received (i.e. not static 2/3).
 Non-faulty OBCs now share the same IC vector.
Step 4: Make a decision
• OBCs 1-3 execute a choice()
function to select a final value from
the redundant input devices
(e.g. median, mean).
Switched Triplex – Reading Data (2)
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
M
OBC2
MCMC C
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
9, 7, 5 X, 7, 5 7, 5
OUT1
MC
OUT2
MC
OUT3
MC
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
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Switched Triplex – Reading Data (3)
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
M
OBC2
MCMC C
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
Step 1: Exchange (Round 1)
• Each redundant input device (any #)
transmits its data to switches 1-3.
 No guarantee non-faulty devices agree.
 A failed device may transmit arbitrarily.
Step 2: Exchange (Round 2)
• Switches 1-3 send each redundant
input message to all OBCs 1-3.
Step 3: Create symmetry
• OBCs 1-3 performs a majority vote of
the message copies received from each
redundant network channel.
 Messages that violate the protocol are dropped.
 Majority must be determined according to number
of messages received (i.e. not static 2/3).
 Non-faulty OBCs now share the same IC vector.
Step 4: Make a decision
• OBCs 1-3 execute a choice()
function to select a final value from
the redundant input devices
(e.g. median, mean).
9, X
7, 7, 7
5, 5, 5
--
7
5
R2 IC
9, X
7, 7, 7
5, 5, 5
--
7
5
R2 IC
9, X
7, 7, 7
5, 5, 5
--
7
5
R2 IC
OUT1
MC
OUT2
MC
OUT3
MC
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
Bitwise majority voting of messages 
received over redundant channels 
can be implemented in the TTE ES 
or driver.  The process is identical 
for all incoming TT traffic.
Note: Voting is over one VL.
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Switched Triplex – Reading Data (4)
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
M
OBC2
MCMC C
Step 1: Exchange (Round 1)
• Each redundant input device (any #)
transmits its data to switches 1-3.
 No guarantee non-faulty devices agree.
 A failed device may transmit arbitrarily.
Step 2: Exchange (Round 2)
• Switches 1-3 send each redundant
input message to all OBCs 1-3.
Step 3: Create symmetry
• OBCs 1-3 performs a majority vote of
the message copies received from each
redundant network channel.
 Messages that violate the protocol are dropped.
 Majority must be determined according to number
of messages received (i.e. not static 2/3).
 Non-faulty OBCs now share the same IC vector.
Step 4: Make a decision
• OBCs 1-3 execute a choice()
function to select a final value from
the redundant input devices
(e.g. median, mean).
--
7
5
IC
6
--
7
5
IC
6
--
7
5
IC
6
OUT1
MC
OUT2
MC
OUT3
MC
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
Data remediation (choice) of 
messages received from multiple 
devices is implemented in the 
application – app specific.
Note: Choice() is over multiple VLs.
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Switched Triplex – Commanding (1)
Step 1: Prepare Command
• After performing computation, OBCs
1-3 each generate a command.
 All non-faulty OBCs agree on the output.
Step 2: Exchange (Round 1)
• Each OBC 1-3 transmits its output
value to all switches 1-3.
Step 3: Exchange (Round 2)
• Switches 1-3 send each input message
to all redundant output devices (any #).
Step 4: Create symmetry
• Each output device performs a majority vote
of messages received from each channel. 
 This IC exchange is required to ensure consensus
of multiple output devices in case of one OBC.
Step 5: Make a decision
• Each output device performs a
second majority vote over the
commands from each OBC.
 I.e. the choice() function for output
devices is always a bitwise majority.
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
M
OBC2
MCMC C
8
OUT1
MC
OUT2
MC
OUT3
MC
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
X 8
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Switched Triplex – Commanding (2)
Step 1: Prepare Command
• After performing computation, OBCs
1-3 each generate a command.
 All non-faulty OBCs agree on the output.
Step 2: Exchange (Round 1)
• Each OBC 1-3 transmits its output
value to all switches 1-3.
Step 3: Exchange (Round 2)
• Switches 1-3 send each input message
to all redundant output devices (any #).
Step 4: Create symmetry
• Each output device performs a majority vote
of messages received from each channel. 
 This IC exchange is required to ensure consensus
of multiple output devices in case of one OBC.
Step 5: Make a decision
• Each output device performs a
second majority vote over the
commands from each OBC.
 I.e. the choice() function for output
devices is always a bitwise majority.
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
M
OBC2
MCMC C
OUT1
MC
OUT2
MC
OUT3
MC
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
X 8
X
8 8
8 8
8 8
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Switched Triplex – Commanding (3)
Step 1: Prepare Command
• After performing computation, OBCs
1-3 each generate a command.
 All non-faulty OBCs agree on the output.
Step 2: Exchange (Round 1)
• Each OBC 1-3 transmits its output
value to all switches 1-3.
Step 3: Exchange (Round 2)
• Switches 1-3 send each input message
to all redundant output devices (any #).
Step 4: Create symmetry
• Each output device performs a majority vote
of messages received from each channel. 
 This IC exchange is required to ensure consensus
of multiple output devices in case of one OBC.
Step 5: Make a decision
• Each output device performs a
second majority vote over the
commands from each OBC.
 I.e. the choice() function for output
devices is always a bitwise majority.
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
X, 8, 8 8, 8, 8 X, 8, 8
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
M
OBC2
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OUT2
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OUT3
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Switched Triplex – Commanding (4)
Step 1: Prepare Command
• After performing computation, OBCs
1-3 each generate a command.
 All non-faulty OBCs agree on the output.
Step 2: Exchange (Round 1)
• Each OBC 1-3 transmits its output
value to all switches 1-3.
Step 3: Exchange (Round 2)
• Switches 1-3 send each input message
to all redundant output devices (any #).
Step 4: Create symmetry
• Each output device performs a majority vote
of messages received from each channel. 
 This IC exchange is required to ensure consensus
of multiple output devices in case of one OBC.
Step 5: Make a decision
• Each output device performs a
second majority vote over the
commands from each OBC.
 I.e. the choice() function for output
devices is always a bitwise majority.
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
X, 8, 8 8, 8, 8 X, 8, 8
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
COTS SBC
TTE ES (NIC)
M
OBC2
MCMC C
OUT1
MC
OUT2
MC
OUT3
MC
X, 8, X
8, 8, 8
8, 8, 8
X
8
8
R2 IC
X, 8, X
8, 8, 8
8, 8, 8
X
8
8
R2 IC
X, 8, X
8, 8, 8
8, 8, 8
X
8
8
R2 IC
Again, this majority vote 
is over one VL and can 
be implemented in the 
NIC or driver.
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Switched Triplex – Commanding (5)
Step 1: Prepare Command
• After performing computation, OBCs
1-3 each generate a command.
 All non-faulty OBCs agree on the output.
Step 2: Exchange (Round 1)
• Each OBC 1-3 transmits its output
value to all switches 1-3.
Step 3: Exchange (Round 2)
• Switches 1-3 send each input message
to all redundant output devices (any #).
Step 4: Create symmetry
• Each output device performs a majority vote
of messages received from each channel. 
 This IC exchange is required to ensure consensus
of multiple output devices in case of one OBC.
Step 5: Make a decision
• Each output device performs a
second majority vote over the
commands from each OBC.
 I.e. the choice() function for output
devices is always a bitwise majority.
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
X, 8, 8 8, 8, 8 X, 8, 8
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OBC3
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TTE ES (NIC)
OBC1
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TTE ES (NIC)
M
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X
8
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8
X
8
8
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8
X
8
8
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Switched Triplex – Monitoring (1)
Step 1: Prepare Command
• After performing computation, OBCs
1-3 each generate a command.
 All non-faulty OBCs agree on the output.
Step 2: Exchange (Round 1)
• Each OBC 1-3 transmits its output
value to all switches 1-3.
Step 3: Exchange (Round 2)
• Switches 1-3 send each input message
“reflected” back to each OBC 1-3.
 Why? Allows CFS app to monitor OBCs for the
purpose of fault detection and reconfiguration.
Step 4: Create symmetry
• Each OBC 1-3 performs a majority vote
of messages received from each channel. 
Step 5: Identify faulty OBC
• OBCs 1-3 perform a majority vote
over the commands from each OBC.
 Identical to action performed by OUT 1-3.
 Can be used to identify OBCs that do
not agree with the majority (for FDIR).
IN1
MC
IN2
MC
IN3
MC
SW1
MC
SW2
MC
SW3
MC
X, 8, 8 8, 8, 8 X, 8, 8
OUT1
MC
OUT2
MC
OUT3
MC
Happening Simultaneously
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TTE ES (NIC)
OBC3
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OBC1
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M
OBC2
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Switched Triplex – Monitoring (2)
Step 1: Prepare Command
• After performing computation, OBCs
1-3 each generate a command.
 All non-faulty OBCs agree on the output.
Step 2: Exchange (Round 1)
• Each OBC 1-3 transmits its output
value to all switches 1-3.
Step 3: Exchange (Round 2)
• Switches 1-3 send each input message
“reflected” back to each OBC 1-3.
 Why? Allows CFS app to monitor OBCs for the
purpose of fault detection and reconfiguration.
Step 4: Create symmetry
• Each OBC 1-3 performs a majority vote
of messages received from each channel. 
Step 5: Identify faulty OBC
• OBCs 1-3 perform a majority vote
over the commands from each OBC.
 Identical to action performed by OUT 1-3.
 Can be used to identify OBCs that do
not agree with the majority (for FDIR).
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IN3
MC
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TTE ES (NIC)
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Switched Triplex – Monitoring (3)
Step 1: Prepare Command
• After performing computation, OBCs
1-3 each generate a command.
 All non-faulty OBCs agree on the output.
Step 2: Exchange (Round 1)
• Each OBC 1-3 transmits its output
value to all switches 1-3.
Step 3: Exchange (Round 2)
• Switches 1-3 send each input message
“reflected” back to each OBC 1-3.
 Why? Allows CFS app to monitor OBCs for the
purpose of fault detection and reconfiguration.
Step 4: Create symmetry
• Each OBC 1-3 performs a majority vote
of messages received from each channel. 
Step 5: Identify faulty OBC
• OBCs 1-3 perform a majority vote
over the commands from each OBC.
 Identical to action performed by OUT 1-3.
 Can be used to identify OBCs that do
not agree with the majority (for FDIR).
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Side Note – Sharing between OBCs
Round 1
Round 2
5
31
X
X
2
31 231 2
5, X, X
Final: X
5, X, X
Final: X
5 (original)
Final: 5
5, X, X
Final: X
5, X, X
Final: X
5, X, X
Final: X
5
5
X
X
X
X
5 5
5 X
X
X X
X
X
I want to 
share 5
Good – Has Consistency Bad – No Consistency
• When sharing a value between OBCs 
(e.g. output monitoring, shared state), the
original sender cannot use its value directly.
• Instead, it performs a majority
vote of the values reflected back
from the switches (i.e. IC).
• This ensures consensus in case
of an arbitrary transmission error.
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Network-Level IC Advantages
Network-Level IC = no host blocking
• Consensus between multiple receivers can be achieved
transparent to the flight software (no impact on CFS).
• If you read a value, you already know it is the voted answer from
a two round exchange – consistent across all receivers (1FT).
• Eliminates classical “acceptance window” for exchanges.
• No need for “read, send, wait … read, send, etc.”
• Minimizes use of host resources (especially if in NIC).
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RIUs and Distributed Intelligence
The Role of the Remote Interface Unit (RIU)
• The RIU acts as a gateway between the TTE network, analog 
devices, and legacy buses (e.g. MIL-STD-1553, ARINC 429).
• Moves signal conditioning closer to sensor/effectors, reducing 
noise and wiring mass.
• Functions it may implement include A/D conversion, network 
formatting, range checking, scaling, linearization, and 
threshold/filter services specific to each subsystem.
• Uses configuration files to map local buffer data to TTE dataports.
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RIUs and Distributed Intelligence
31 2
1
S
Approach 1: 
• One RIU
• One sensor
Problems?
• Sensor data sent to
RIU may be wrong.
The Fix:
• Add redundant sensors
and have RIU remediate
between them.
Onboard Flight Computer
Remote Interface Unit (RIU)
Sensor or Actuator
TTE network switch (COM/MON)
Designates faulty device
Triplex has consensus on:
1. Non-existent data
2. Incorrect data
Subsystem cannot function
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RIUs and Distributed Intelligence
31 2
Approach 2: 
• One RIU
• Remediation b/w multiple sensors
Problems?
• RIU could fail internally, resulting in:
1. No-transmission
2. Symmetric faulty transmission
The Fix:
• Increase resilience of the RIU:
1. TMR of processor elements (e.g. Maxwell
SCS750 used on ESA Gaia satellite).
2. True dual-core lock-step processor (i.e.
fully isolated self-checking).
• COTS products like ARM Cortex-R4/R5
not available in rad-tolerant variants.
Onboard Flight Computer
Remote Interface Unit (RIU)
Sensor or Actuator
TTE network switch (COM/MON)
Designates faulty device
S
S
S
S
1
Not good 
enough?
Replicate 
the RIU
Triplex has consensus on:
1. Non-existent data
2. Incorrect data
Subsystem cannot function
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RIUs and Distributed Intelligence
31 2
Approach 3: 
• One RIU with HI processor
• Remediation b/w multiple sensors
Problems?
• TTE ES could fail arbitrarily, resulting in:
1. No-transmission
2. Symmetric faulty transmission
3. Byzantine transmission 
The Fix:
• Increase resilience of the end system:
1. TMR in the TTE Chip-IP MAC layer.
2. Use a COM/MON HI end system.
• Not available in TTTech Space ASIC.
Onboard Flight Computer
Remote Interface Unit (RIU)
Sensor or Actuator
TTE network switch (COM/MON)
Designates faulty device
S
S
S
S
1
Triplex has consensus on:
1. Non-existent data
2. Incorrect data
Not good 
enough?
Replicate 
the RIU
Subsystem cannot function
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RIUs and Distributed Intelligence
31 2
Approach 4: 
• Multiple RIUs
• Each reads redundant sensors
Problems?
• None.  Any arbitrary failure of an RIU
is tolerated by the Triplex computers:
• Choice() function is application specific.
Caveats:
• Each RIU performs only minimal local
processing (e.g. message packing).
• No consensus is required between RIUs 
before transmitting data.
• Since OBCs make decisions, OBCs
require the consistency.
Onboard Flight Computer
Remote Interface Unit (RIU)
Sensor or Actuator
TTE network switch (COM/MON)
Designates faulty device
Triplex has consensus on:
1. Correct data
2. Skewed data (by RIU1)
S
S
S
S
1
S
S
S
S
2
S
S
S
S
N
…
Subsystem able to function
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RIUs and Distributed Intelligence
31 2
Approach 5: 
• Multiple RIUs
• Each reads redundant sensors
• RIUs require consensus
Description
• If consensus between RIUs is necessary
without interacting with the OBCs, then
IC can be performed between RIUs.
• Uses redundant network channels
to provide the necessary FCRs.
• Process is similar to classical
channelized bus voting approach.
Caveats:
• Can make architecture much more complex.
• 1FT bus commanding may require 3 RIUs.
Onboard Flight Computer
Remote Interface Unit (RIU)
Sensor or Actuator
TTE network switch (COM/MON)
Designates faulty device
S
S
S
S
1
S
S
S
S
2
S
S
S
S
N
…
Subsystem 
able to function
RIUs achieve 
consensus at 
local level.
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Notional Onboard Traffic Flow
1FT C&DH System
Time-Triggered (SAE AS6802)
(Vehicle Command and Control)
Effectors
• Heaters
• Pumps
• Valves
• Motors
• All messaging is into/out of  C&DH system.
• Periodic and generally low bandwidth.
< 5 Mbit/s
> 100 Mbit/s
< 10 Mbit/s
< 5 Mbit/s
Sensor Data
(High rate)
• Optical navigation
• Autonomous systems
Distributed 
Processing
• RIU/DAU
• Star tracker
• Propulsion
• ECLSS
Sensor Data
(Low rate)
• Star tracker
• IMU/SIGI
• Sun sensor
• Thrusters
• Temperature
• Humidity
• Oxygen, CO2
• Flow rate
• Voltage
Onboard
Gateway
Best-Effort (IEEE 802.3)
(Crew interfaces and science)
• Classical LANs can run isolated from
or overlapping TT/RC network.
• COTS hardware easily upgraded.
Rate-Constrained (A664-p7)
(Asynchronous critical systems)
• Traffic shaping and policing ensures
successful message delivery.
• Provides event-driven communication
between synchronization domains.
High Speed Serial
(P2P, minimal networking)
• Provides >1Gbit/s point-to-point or 
(possibly) networked messaging.
• Mostly related to off-board communication.
Docking
Interface
Command/ 
Telemetry 
Processing
DTN Storage/ 
Processing
Direct audio/
video signals
Transponders (SDR)
S-band, Ka-band, X-
band, Proximity (UHF)
Onboard
Displays
Classical Ethernet LAN
IEEE 802.11n
Cameras, 
Audio, and 
Portable 
Devices
RC frames can 
be generated by 
COTS devices 
[1] Rakow, Glenn Spacecraft Crew-
Vehicle Avionics Networks and 
Communication Flow
< 10 Mbit/s
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Notional Onboard Traffic Flow
1FT C&DH System
Time-Triggered (SAE AS6802)
(Vehicle Command and Control)
Effectors
• Heaters
• Pumps
• Valves
• Motors
• All messaging is into/out of  C&DH system.
• Periodic and generally low bandwidth.
< 5 Mbit/s
> 100 Mbit/s
< 10 Mbit/s
< 5 Mbit/s
Sensor Data
(High rate)
• Optical navigation
• Autonomous systems
Distributed 
Processing
• RIU/DAU
• Star tracker
• Propulsion
• ECLSS
Sensor Data
(Low rate)
• Star tracker
• IMU/SIGI
• Sun sensor
• Thrusters
• Temperature
• Humidity
• Oxygen, CO2
• Flow rate
• Voltage
Onboard
Gateway
Best-Effort (IEEE 802.3)
(Crew interfaces and science)
• Classical LANs can run isolated from
or overlapping TT/RC network.
• COTS hardware easily upgraded.
Rate-Constrained (A664-p7)
(Asynchronous critical systems)
• Traffic shaping and policing ensures
successful message delivery.
• Provides event-driven communication
between synchronization domains.
High Speed Serial
(P2P, minimal networking)
• Provides >1Gbit/s point-to-point or 
(possibly) networked messaging.
• Mostly related to off-board communication.
Docking
Interface
Command/ 
Telemetry 
Processing
DTN Storage/ 
Processing
Direct audio/
video signals Transponders (SDR)
S-band, Ka-band, X-
band, Proximity (UHF)
Onboard
Displays
RF Equipment
Amplifiers, switches
Classical Ethernet LAN
IEEE 802.11n
Cameras, 
Audio, and 
Portable 
Devices
RC frames can 
be generated by 
COTS devices 
[1] Rakow, Glenn Spacecraft Crew-
Vehicle Avionics Networks and 
Communication Flow
Command/ 
Telemetry 
Processing
DTN Storage/ 
Processing
Data 
Recorders
Equipment 
unique cabling
Rate-constrained
traffic can be used
by subsystems
traditionally limited
to P2P comm.
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Notional Onboard Traffic Flow
1FT C&DH System
Time-Triggered (SAE AS6802)
(Vehicle Command and Control)
Effectors
• Heaters
• Pumps
• Valves
• Motors
• All messaging is into/out of  C&DH system.
• Periodic and generally low bandwidth.
< 5 Mbit/s
> 100 Mbit/s
< 10 Mbit/s
< 5 Mbit/s
Sensor Data
(High rate)
• Optical navigation
• Autonomous systems
Distributed 
Processing
• RIU/DAU
• Star tracker
• Propulsion
• ECLSS
Sensor Data
(Low rate)
• Star tracker
• IMU/SIGI
• Sun sensor
• Thrusters
• Temperature
• Humidity
• Oxygen, CO2
• Flow rate
• Voltage
Onboard
Gateway
Best-Effort (IEEE 802.3)
(Crew interfaces and science)
• Classical LANs can run isolated from
or overlapping TT/RC network.
• COTS hardware easily upgraded.
Rate-Constrained (A664-p7)
(Asynchronous critical systems)
• Traffic shaping and policing ensures
successful message delivery.
• Provides event-driven communication
between synchronization domains.
High Speed Serial
(P2P, minimal networking)
• Provides >1Gbit/s point-to-point or 
(possibly) networked messaging.
• Mostly related to off-board communication.
Docking
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Command/ 
Telemetry 
Processing
DTN Storage/ 
Processing
Direct audio/
video signals Transponders (SDR)
S-band, Ka-band, X-
band, Proximity (UHF)
Onboard
Displays
RF Equipment
Amplifiers, switches
Classical Ethernet LAN
IEEE 802.11n
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Audio, and 
Portable 
Devices
RC frames can 
be generated by 
COTS devices 
[1] Rakow, Glenn Spacecraft Crew-
Vehicle Avionics Networks and 
Communication Flow
Command/ 
Telemetry 
Processing
DTN Storage/ 
Processing
Data 
Recorders
Equipment 
unique cabling
Voting at 
Interface
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Questions?
